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EVIDENCE - USE OF PRIOR BAD ACTS NOT RESULTING IN 
CONVICTION ARE PERMISSIBLE FOR IMPEACHMENT PUR-
POSES IF PROBATIVE OF VERACITY AND READILY PROVA-
BLE. State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173, 468 A.2d 319 (1983). 
The defense counsel in a rape case asked the prosecutrix on cross-
examination whether she had previously brought an assault charge 
against a former boyfriend. l After an objection to this question was sus-
tained, the defense counsel proffered that the prosecutrix had previously 
charged a former boyfriend with criminal assault and then recanted the 
charge while testifying at his tria1. 2 The trial judge rejected the argument 
that the recantation under oath was relevant to the prosecutrix's credibil-
ity, and prohibited further questioning on the matter.3 The defendant 
was subsequently found guilty4 and appealed to the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland, which reversed the conviction. 5 The court of appeals 
granted certiorari and affirmed, holding that the inquiry into a false accu-
sation previously made by the prosecutrix while under oath was proper 
for impeachment purposes.6 
English common law allowed inquiry into any particular miscon-
duct of a witness that tended to impugn his character (a prior bad act), 
even though the act had not been the basis for a criminal conviction. 7 
Although this questioning presented the dangers of harassing the witness 
and of undue prejudice, the disciplined discretion of the bar was relied 
upon to avoid abuses.8 In this country, however, there is a lack of agree-
ment as to whether prior bad acts can be used for impeachment pur-
poses.9 Generally, evidence of particular instances of misconduct is 
inadmissible for impeachment purposes on the grounds that its introduc-
tion may result in confusion of the jury and unfair surprise to the oppo-
nent. lO Prior misconduct, however, tends to be more probative of a 
witness's lack of veracity than does opinion or reputation testimony.ll 
1. State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173, 176, 468 A.2d 319, 320 (1983). 
2. [d. at 177, 468 A.2d at 320. Defense counsel proffered that the prosecutrix "first 
came into court and said that [the defendant] did commit the assault, and then on 
cross-examination the information I have is that she then recanted it." [d. 
3. [d. at 177,468 A.2d at 321. 
4. [d. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
5. Cox v. State, 51 Md. App. 271,443 A.2d 607 (1982), afJ'd, 298 Md. 173,468 A.2d 
319 (1983). 
6. Cox v. State, 298 Md. 173, 468 A.2d 319 (1983). The trial judge had therefore 
abused his discretion by not allowing defense counsel to cross-examine the witness. 
[d. at 184, 468 A.2d at 324. 
7. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 42 (E. 
Cleary 3rd ed. 1984). There are five means of attacking the credibility of a witness: 
(1) prior inconsistent statements; (2) bias; (3) attacks upon character; (4) defects in 
capacity to observe or remember; and (5) disproving the facts testified to by the 
witness. [d. § 33. 
8. [d. § 42. 
9. See infra notes 14-20 and accompanying text. 
10. See 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 979, at 826-27 
(Chadbom rev. 1970). 
11. See id. One commentator stated: "It is easier to believe that a person is dishonest 
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Thus, in recognition of the importance of assessing a witness's credibility, 
two exceptions to the general rule forbidding the introduction of specific 
instances of misconduct have been created by judicial decision. Subject 
to the trial court's discretion, prior acts resulting in conviction are gener-
ally admissible so long as they are relevant to determining a witness's 
credibility.12 The rationale for this rule is that the misconduct has been 
conclusively established, thereby obviating the danger that the witness's 
veracity will be unfairly impugned. 13 The second recognized exception, 
concerning prior bad acts not resulting in conviction, cannot be so un-
equivocally stated. 
Discord among the jurisdictions concerning the admissibility of 
prior bad acts not resulting in conviction has resulted in three different 
approaches. The majority of courts,14 as well as the Federal Rules of 
and untruthful when it can be shown that he has been dishonest and untruthful 
before, than it is to believe that a person is dishonest and untruthful because his 
neighbors and associates believe him to be so." Note, Impeaching and Rehabilitat-
ing a Witness With Character Evidence: Reputation, Opinion, Specific Acts and Prior 
Convictions, 9 V.C.D. L. REV. 319, 329 (1976). Impeachment by opinion or reputa-
tion testimony is more common than impeachment by prior misconduct. Section 9-
115 of the Maryland Code of Courts and Judicial Proceedings abrogated the com-
mon law rule that only allowed a character witness to testify as to the defendant's 
reputation for truthfulness in the community. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. 
§ 9-115 (1984); see also Kelley v. State, 288 Md. 298,418 A.2d 217 (1980) (charac-
ter witness can give personal opinion if there is an adequate basis for that opinion). 
12. See, e.g., United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 
V.S. 1111 (1977); Sims v. Callahan, 269 Ala. 216,112 So. 2d 776 (1959); Griggs v. 
State, 494 P.2d 795 (Alaska 1972); People v. Birdette, 22 III. 2d 577, 177 N.E.2d 170 
(1961). See generally G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION To THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
§ 81, at 285-92 (1978); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 43; 3A J. WIGMORE, supra 
note 10, § 980, at 985-87. The Federal Rules of Evidence allow impeachment for all 
crimes involving dishonesty and for other major crimes when the probative value of 
the conviction outweighs its prejudicial impact. FED. R. EVID. 609(a). For a dis-
cussion of Federal Rule 609(a), as well as a suggested approach for applying the rule 
when the witness is the criminal defendant, see Surratt, Prior-Conviction Impeach-
ment Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach to Applying the 
"Balancing" Provision of Rule 609(a), 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 907 (1980). As to the 
admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment purposes in Maryland, see Rick-
etts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 708,436 A.2d 906,910 (1981) (allowing the introduction 
of felonies, infamous crimes, crimes involving moral turpitude, deceit, or dishon-
esty, and lesser crimes that reflect upon truthtelling). Difficulty exists, however, in 
determining whether a prior conviction is relevant to credibility. One Maryland 
court noted that "no rigid classification of crimes seems possible." Linkin v. State, 
202 Md. 212, 220, 96 A.2d 246,250 (1953). Another court, noting what it called a 
lacuna in Maryland case law, reasoned that this ambiguity regarding prior convic-
tions "has done much to unsettle and to confuse the law." Taylor v. State, 278 Md. 
150, 155,360 A.2d 430,434 (1976) (quoting 3A J. WIG,.MORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS 
AT COMMON LAW § 987 (Chadborn rev. 1970». 
13. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 980, at 828; see Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 
436 A.2d 906 (1981). 
14. See, e.g., Vogel v. Sylvester, 148 Conn. 666, 174 A.2d 122 (1961); Lehr v. Rogers, 
16 Mich. App. 585, 168 N.W.2d 636 (1969); State v. Cleveland, 583 S.W.2d 263 
(Mo. App. 1979); Schreiberg v. Southern Coatings & Chem. Co., 231 S.C. 69, 97 
S.E.2d 214 (1957); see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 42. 
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Evidence, IS allow inquiry into acts that are probative of a witness's verac-
ity. Other courts permit cross-examination regarding any specific act 
that demonstrates a lack of moral character. 16 Under this liberal ap-
proach, the act may be only slightly related to credibility,17 A minority of 
courts, however, prohibits any inquiry into acts of misconduct for which 
there has been no criminal conviction. IS Although few jurisdictions have 
adopted this blanket prohibition, one commentator argues that this rule 
is the fairest because it lessens the dangers of prejudice to the witness, 
confusion of the issues, and abuse in the asking of unfounded questions. 19 
In addition, this commentator asserts that this approach is practical in 
that it is often difficult to determine whether particular acts are probative 
of a witness's veracity.20 
The confusion among the various jurisdictions regarding the admis-
sibility of prior bad acts is reflected in the disparate decisions that often 
exist within one jurisdiction.21 Maryland courts recognize that deci-
sional law regarding the use of prior bad acts to impeach is inconsis-
tent.22 The Maryland rule regarding the admissibility of accusations of 
crime or misconduct, however, is explicit: mere accusations are strictly 
forbidden. 23 In addition, Maryland courts have consistently held that ex-
trinsic evidence of particular acts may not be used to impeach the char-
15. FED. R. EVID. 608(b). Federal Rule 608(b) provides: 
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking 
or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in 
rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in 
the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness be 
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his char-
acter for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character 
for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character 
the witness being cross-examined has testified. 
See United States v. Estell, 539 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 982 
(1976). 
16. See People V. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198,93 N.E.2d 637 (1950); State V. Jones, 215 Tenn. 
20, 385 S.W.2d 80 (1964); see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 42. 
17. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 42. 
18. See Coleman V. Southern Pac., 141 Cal. 2d 121, 296 P.2d 386 (1956); Berliner V. 
Schoenberg, 117 Pa. Super. 254, 178 A. 330 (1935); Christie V. Brewer, 374 S. W.2d 
908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 42. 
19. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 83; see also COX V. State, 51 Md. App. 271, 
286,443 A.2d 607, 617 (1982) (Lowe, J., dissenting), affd, 298 Md. 173,468 A.2d 
319 (1983) (quoting C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 83). 
20. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 83. 
21. Compare Neam V. State, 14 Md. App. 180, 286 A.2d 540 (1972) (prior bad acts 
falling short of arrest completely inadmissible) with Mulligan V. State, 18 Md. App. 
588, 308 A.2d 418 (1973) (prior bad acts admissible if probative of veracity). See 
also COX V. State, 51 Md. App. 271, 286, 443 A.2d 607,617 (1982) (Lowe, J., dis-
senting) (confusion exists in Maryland as to the rule concerning prior bad acts), 
affd, 298 Md. 173,468 A.2d 319 (1983). See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 
7, at 82. 
22. See COX V. State, 51 Md. App. 271, 286,443 A.2d 607, 617 (1982) (Lowe, J., dis-
senting), affd, 298 Md. 173,468 A.2d 319 (1983); Johnson V. State, 30 Md. App. 
512, 514, 352 A.2d 371, 372 (1976). 
23. See Martens Chevrolet V. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 339-40,439 A.2d 534, 540-41 (1982); 
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acter or reputation of a witness.24 Extrinsic evidence, or independent 
proof, is evidence obtained from a source such as documents or witnesses 
other than the witness sought to be impeached.25 Confusion resulted, 
however, when the courts failed clearly to determine whether a witness 
could be questioned directly as to his own prior bad acts.26 
As early as 1919, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Rau v. 
State,21 recognized as well settled the rule that a witness could be im-
peached only by attacking his reputation for truth and veracity, and not 
by inquiry into particular acts of misconduct, even though the particular 
act may have been probative of veracity.28 This broad statement of the 
rule, however, has led to confusion because the Rau court appeared to be 
prohibiting only extrinsic evidence of a witness's prior bad acts, and not 
direct inquiry into the witness's own such acts.29 Thus, the Rau court 
left unanswered whether a witness could be questioned about his own 
prior bad acts for impeachment purposes. In the 1937 case of Mahan v. 
State,30 the court of appeals had an opportunity to clarify the ambiguity 
created by Rau, but failed to do so. In Mahan, a wrongful death action 
against a taxicab driver, the driver was asked on direct examination to 
state his age. On cross-examination he was asked whether he had falsely 
stated his age in a chauffeur's license application.3l Instead of delineat-
ing a rule as to whether inquiry into a witness's own prior bad acts was 
allowed, the court, reasoning that the driver's misstatement of his age 
adversely reflected on his credibility, summarily concluded that it was 
"obvious enough" that such a line of inquiry was permissible. 32 Thus, 
Burgess v. State, 161 Md. 162, 170, 155 A. 153, 156 (1931). See generally Annot., 
28 A.L.R.4TH 505 (1984). 
24. See, e.g., Martens Chevrolet v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 439 A.2d 534 (1982); Richard-
son v. State, 103 Md. 112,63 A. 317 (1906); Potfv. State, 3 Md. App. 289,239 A.2d 
121 (1968). 
25. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 67. 
26. See Johnson v. State, 30 Md. App. 512, 514,352 A.2d 371, 372 (1976); Rau v. 
State, 133 Md. 613, 616-17, 105 A. 867, 868 (1919). 
27. 133 Md. 613, 105 A. 867 (1919). 
28. Id. at 616-18, 105 A. at 867. 
29. Id. The confusion caused by the decision is indicated by the belief of the court of 
special appeals in Cox that Rau was not good precedent. Cox v. State, 51 Md. App. 
271,275,443 A.2d 607, 610 (1982), affd, 298 Md. 173,468 A.2d 319 (1983). 
30. 172 Md. 373, 191 A. 575 (1937). 
31. Id. at 379-80, 191 A. at 578-79. 
32. Id. at 380, 191 A. at 579. The case of Sappington v. Fairfax, 135 Md. 186, 108 A. 
575 (1919), a suit for malicious prosecution, also failed to clarify the rule regarding 
the admissibility of prior bad acts. The trial court in Sappington had permitted a 
defense witness to be cross-examined as to whether he knew at the time he testified 
against the plaintiff before a grand jury that the plaintiff had not stolen the property 
in question. The court of appeals in Sappington simply held that the evidence was, if 
for no other purpose, at least admissible for the purpose of attacking the witness's 
credibility. Id. at 192, 108 A. at 578. After these early cases, one commentator 
termed the law in Maryland regarding prior bad acts as "obfuscated." Kauffman, 
Impeachment and Rehabilitation of Witnesses in Maryland, 7 MD. L. REv. 118, 126 
(1943). 
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Mahan seemed to limit Rau to prohibiting extrinsic evidence of prior bad 
acts, but allowing the witness himself to be asked about them. 
Subsequent case law failed to elucidate a Maryland rule concerning 
inquiry into a witness's own prior bad acts. In Neam v. State,33 the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the state could not cross-
examine the defendant as to his prior narcotics addiction for purposes of 
impeachment.34 The court first analogized the use of prior bad acts to 
the use of prior convictions, noting that the admissibility of prior convic-
tions for impeachment purposes had been limited by statute.3S Because 
of the danger of insufficient proof of prior bad acts not resulting in con-
viction, the court therefore determined, in contrast to Mahan, that it was 
logical to exclude completely evidence of prior misconduct falling short 
of arrest. 36 The Neam court further reasoned that although narcotics ad-
diction was highly relevant to the witness's credibility, evidence of the 
addiction was inadmissible because of the undue prejudice to the witness 
that would result from its use. 37 
Another Maryland case, however, deviated from Neam's total pro-
hibition of evidence of prior misconduct falling short of arrest. In De-
Lilly v. State, 38 the court of special appeals held that the trial court erred 
in refusing to permit the defendant in a rape case to impeach the victim's 
identification testimony by showing that she had previously misidentified 
another person accused of rape.39 The basis for the DeLiIly court's hold-
ing was that the specific act was directly relevant to the witness's credi-
bility.40 Thus, the conflicting decisions in DeLiIly and Neam, as well as 
the ambiguity created by Rau, left the law unsettled regarding the use of 
33. 14 Md. App. 180, 286 A.2d 540 (1972). 
34. Id. at 187-90, 286 A.2d at 545-46. 
35. Id. at 188, 286 A.2d at 545. The Neam court was referring to what is now MD. CTs. 
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1O-905(a) (1984), which provides in pertinent part: 
"[e]vidence of conviction is not admissible if an appeal is pending, or the time for an 
appeal has not expired, or the conviction has been reversed, and there has been no 
retrial or reconviction." 
36. Neam, 14 Md. App. at 187-90, 286 A.2d at 545-46. 
37. Id. The court balanced the undue prejudice against the utility of determining testi-
monial veracity. Another decision that stood for the proposition that Maryland 
courts would be firm in refusing to allow inquiry into prior bad acts to impeach was 
Martens Chevrolet v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 439 A.2d 534 (1982). In Martens, the 
court of appeals decided whether defense counsel, in a negligent misrepresentation 
case, could cross-examine a witness as to whether the witness had been charged with 
fraud in a previous lawsuit. Id. at 338-39, 439 A.2d at 540-41. In holding that the 
introduction of the question consituted reversible error, the court stated that Mary-
land courts have firmly adhered to the rule forbidding evidence of specific acts for 
impeachment purposes, particularly when the evidence amounts to a mere accusa-
tion. Id. at 340, 439 A.2d at 541. 
38. 11 Md. App. 676,276 A.2d 417 (1971). 
39. Id. at 680-81, 276 A.2d at 419. 
40. Id. A similar case to DeLi/ly is Mulligan v. State, 18 Md. App. 588,308 A.2d 418 
(1973). In Mulligan, the court of special appeals held that it was reversible error to 
disallow cross-examination of the state's main witness, a police officer, concerning 
the officer's having been found guilty in a police disciplinary proceeding for falsify-
ing police reports. Id. at 597, 308 A.2d at 423. The court held that although it was 
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prior bad acts for impeachment purposes. Extrinsic evidence of prior 
bad acts was clearly prohibited, but the propriety of inquiry directed at 
the witness himself was undecided. 
The case of State v. Cox 41 presented the issue whether the testimony 
of a prosecuting witness in a rape case could be impeached on cross-
examination by inquiry into specific acts of prior misconduct.42 The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland held that inquiry into prior bad acts was 
permissible provided there was a reasonable basis for the question and 
the misconduct was probative of the witness's credibility.43 In reaching 
this conclusion, the court first referred to the general rule that a witness 
may be cross-examined as to any matter that would be likely to affect his 
credibility.44 In analogizing to the rule that extrinsic evidence of prior 
convictions is permitted to impeach provided the conviction is relevant to 
credibility,4S the Cox court concluded that a witness could also be asked 
about prior bad acts not resulting in conviction, so long as they were 
relevant to credibility.46 Such inquiry could only be conducted, however, 
when there was a reasonable basis for the question, there was little likeli-
hood that confusion of the issue would result, and the purpose of the 
inquiry was not to embarrass or harass the witness.47 
The admissibility of prior bad acts was distinguished from the ad-
missibility of a mere accusation of misconduct on the ground that evi-
dence of prior bad acts established a fact rather than an accusation; here 
the evidence established that the witness had lied under oath in a similar 
situation.48 The court buttressed its reasoning by distinguishing Martens 
Chevrolet v. Seney,49 a fraud case relied on by the prosecution. In Mar-
tens, the court of appeals held that questioning a witness regarding 
whether he had previously been charged with fraud constituted reversible 
error. so In distinguishing Martens, the Cox court emphasized that for 
not authorizing a "baseless fishing expedition" into the witness's alleged miscon-
duct, such inquiry was crucial because it indicated the officer's lack of veracity. Id. 
41. State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173,468 A.2d 319 (19.83). 
42. Id. at 180-81,468 A.2d at 322. Maryland's rape shield law prohibits the introduc-
tion of evidence relating to a prosecutrix's reputation for unchastity in rape cases. 
Specific acts of sexual conduct are generally inadmissible, although previous consen-
sual encounters with the accused are admissible as evidence of the probability of 
consent. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (1957). See generally Note, Rape And 
Other Sexual Offense Law Reform in Maryland, 1976-1977, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 151 
(1977). Cox dealt with none of these issues. State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173,468 A.2d 
319 (1983). 
43. 298 Md. at 184, 468 A.2d at 324. 
44. Id. at 178,468 A.2d at 321 (citing Harris v. State, 237 Md. 299, 302, 206 A.2d 254, 
256 (1965); Kantor v. Ash, 215 Md. 285, 290, 137 A.2d 661, 664 (1958». 
45. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
46. Cox, 298 Md. at 178-79,468 A.2d at 321-22. 
47. Id. at 179,468 A.2d at 322. 
48. Id. at 183, 468 A.2d at 323. 
49. 292 Md. 328, 439 A.2d 534 (1982). 
50. /d. at 340, 439 A.2d at 541. The witness in Martens was not a party to the action. 
Courts generally will apply stricter scrutiny when the witness is a party, especially 
when the witness is the defendant. See United States v. Schiller, 187 F.2d 572, 576 
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impeachment purposes, the proper inquiry was whether the witness actu-
ally committed the act, not whether he had been merely accused of com-
mitting it,51 Accusations of guilt are hearsay and therefore have little 
bearing on a witness's credibility. Hence, the court concluded that the 
inquiry in Martens did not purport to elicit information probative of the 
witness's truth telling. 52 In Cox, the prosecutrix had lied under oath. 
This act related directly to her character for veracity and therefore aided 
the jury's assessment of her credibility. In addition, the court noted that 
the witness was not disadvantaged by unfair surprise because the exam-
iner was bound by her answer; if the prosecutrix denied the prior miscon-
duct, extrinsic evidence could not be introduced to contradict her. 53 
The court also distinguished the rule set forth in Rau v. State 54 for-
bidding the introduction of extrinsic evidence as to prior bad acts. In 
Rau, a statutory rape case, the prosecutrix's father was asked on cross-
examination whether his daughter had once told him that she had had 
sexual relations with a neighbor, and then later recanted her accusation. 
Although the specific act was probative of the witness's credibility, the 
Cox court noted that the inquiry was made to one who had not commit-
ted the act, and therefore constituted inadmissible extrinsic evidence. 55 
Thus, the Cox decision interpreted Rau as establishing a general rule that 
although extrinsic evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible for impeach-
ment purposes, the witness may be questioned on cross-examination 
about prior bad acts that are probative of his own credibility.56 
The Cox court then determined that although the scope of cross-
examination is ordinarily within the sound discretion of the trial judge, 
the judge may not limit examination so that the accused is clearly pre-
vented from obtaining a fair trial. 57 Thus, inquiry into a prior false accu-
sation of assault made by the prosecutrix was relevant to determining her 
credibility, particularly when the prosecution's case depended upon her 
identification of the defendant. The court held that the trial judge's pro-
hibition of the defense counsel's inquiry was reversible error. 58 
Under our adversarial system of justice, a trial is characterized as a 
search for the truth. 59 In order to obtain this result, the fact finder must 
often choose between conflicting testimony. It is therefore essential that 
the witness's veracity, and hence his credibility, be subject to cross-exam-
(2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, C.]., concurring); Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701,436 A.2d 
906 (1981); Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1976). See generally Note, 
Limiting The Use of Prior Bad Acts and Convictions to Impeach the Defendant- Wit-
ness, 45 ALB. L. REV. 1099 (1981). 
51. 298 Md. at 181,468 A.2d at 322-23. 
52.Id. 
53. Id. at 179,468 A.2d at 321-22. 
54. 133 Md. 613, 105 A. 867 (1919). 
55. Cox, 298 Md. at 182-83, 468 A.2d at 323. 
56.Id. 
57. Id. at 183-84, 468 A.2d at 324. 
58. Id. at 184-85, 468 A.2d at 324-25. 
59. Id. at 178, 468 A.2d at 321. 
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ination. Although the risk of undue prejudice to the witness exists, im-
peachment by the introduction of prior bad acts is necessary to further 
the goal of determining the truth. 
Cox clarified the Maryland rule concerning use of prior bad acts for 
impeachment purposes, and aligned Maryland with the majority of juris-
dictions. 6O The Cox court recognized the balance that must be struck 
between the right to cross-examine a witness and assess his credibility, 
and the possible unfair prejudice that could result from admitting spe-
cific instances of misconduct. The jurisdictions prohibiting any cross-
examination into prior misconduct61 demonstrate more concern with 
preventing abuses resulting from the admission of prior bad acts than 
with properly assessing a witness's credibility. In wisely rejecting this 
blanket prohibition, Cox emphasizes that allowing relevant cross-exami-
nation to rebut any assumption of the witness's veracity is necessary to 
further the search for the truth. 
Although Cox provides some guidelines as to what types of prior 
bad acts are admissible, its holding is limited by the narrow issue consid-
ered by the court. The Cox court restricted the issue to whether a prose-
cutrix in a rape case could be impeached by prior bad acts. The court 
therefore left open whether a character witness or defendant could also 
be impeached by prior bad acts.62 A case decided by the court of appeals 
the day after Cox, however, interpreted Cox as applying to all wit-
nesses.63 Robinson v. State 64 provided a clear test for determining when 
prior bad acts are admissible for impeachment purposes. 65 Relying on 
Cox, the court established a two-pronged test that permits a witness to be 
questioned only about prior bad acts that: (1) were closely related to the 
witness's veracity; and (2) contained a reasonable basis for believing that 
the conduct has actually occurred.66 This two-pronged test provides a 
useful guide to Maryland attorneys by preventing the confusion that 
would have resulted from the narrow holding in Cox. 
Because of the obvious dangers of insufficient proof, the probative 
value of admitting prior bad acts should be subject to greater scrutiny 
than the probative value of prior convictions. The Robinson court, fol-
lowing this reasoning, indicated that in certain instances inquiry about 
60. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
61. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. There is, however, at least one exception 
recognized in California: prior false claims brought by juvenile girls in sex offense 
cases. See People v. Hurlburt, 166 Cal. App. 2d 334, 333 P.2d 82 (1958). For a 
discussion of the admissibility of accusations against others similar to charges now 
brought in sex offense cases, see Annot., 75 A.L.R.2n 500 (1961). 
62. Cox, 298 Md. at 180-81, 468 A.2d at 322. 
63. Robinson v. State, 298 Md. 193,468 A.2d 328 (1983). 
64. [d. 
65. The court in Robinson rejected the argument that a character witness's alleged as-
sault, arson, and unauthorized departure from a mental institution were proper 
grounds of inquiry on cross-examination. [d. at 198-200,468 A.2d at 331. 
66. [d. at 201, 468 A.2d at 333. The Robinson court held that the previous acts of 
misconduct failed the first prong of the test. [d. at 198-200, 468 A.2d at 331-32. 
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prior bad acts not resulting in convictions should not be allowed even 
though the same inquiry should be allowed if conviction had resulted. 67 
Thus, under Cox and Robinson, particular acts of dishonesty such as fal-
sifying reports,68 lying on applications,69 and bringing false claims70 will 
be admissible because they are probative of a witness's veracity. In com-
parison, accusations of misconduct,71 drug addictions,72 and indecent 
and unchaste acts73 will be inadmissible because they do not aid the 
factfinder in determining whether the witness is telling the truth. Robin-
son also indicated that assaults not resulting in convictions will be inad-
missible because acts committed in the heat of passion have little bearing 
on a witness's tendency to tell the truth. 74 
Maryland courts have admitted prior bad acts for impeachment pur-
poses only when the prior acts were documented. Previous documenta-
tion therefore seems to be required by the "reasonable basis" prong of the 
Robinson test. Thus, trial transcripts,75 state records,76 and administra-
tive reports77 have been deemed to establish a sufficient basis for inquiry 
into prior bad acts. 
Whether undocumented evidence of prior bad acts may be used to 
impeach is left unanswered by both Cox and Robinson. The reasonable 
basis prong of the Robinson test should be limited to only those acts that 
are documented, however, in order to prevent unfounded questions from 
being asked. This interpretation also facilitates formation of more spe-
cific questions, which diminishes the impact of a witness's denial of the 
prior bad act. As noted in Cox, a witness's denial of a prior bad act 
requires counsel to accept the answer and thus precludes him from fur-
ther efforts to impeach through that particular bad act.78 The more de-
tailed the cross-examiner's question, however, the greater the possibility 
that the jury will believe the witness committed the act, because the spe-
cific nature of the inquiry suggests that a reasonable basis exists for be-
lieving the conduct actually took place.79 Moreover, if the jury believes 
67. Robinson v. State, 298 Md. 193, 200, 468 A.2d 328, 332 (1983). 
68. See Mulligan v. State, 18 Md. App. 588, 308 A.2d 418 (1973). 
69. See Mahan v. State, 172 Md. 373, 191 A. 575 (1937). 
70. See State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173,468 A.2d 319 (1983). 
71. See Martens Chevrolet v. Seney, 292 Md. 328,439 A.2d 534 (1982). 
72. See Neam v. State, 14 Md. App. 180, 286 A.2d 540 (1972). 
73. See Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 436 A.2d 906 (1981); Richardson v. State, 103 
Md. 112,63 A. 317 (1906). 
74. Robinson v. State, 298 Md. 193, 198-99, 468 A.2d 328, 331 (1983); cf Thomas v. 
State, 29 Md. App. 45, 349 A.2d 384 (1975) (prior assault conviction inadmissable 
on issue of credibility), cert. denied, 278 Md. 736 (1976). 
75. See State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173,468 A.2d 319 (1983). 
76. See Mahan v. State, 172 Md. 373, 191 A. 575 (1937). 
77. See Mulligan v. State, 18 Md. App. 588, 308 A.2d 418 (1973). 
78. State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173, 179,468 A.2d 319, 321-22 (1983). 
79. See 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 981, at 838. For example, consider the fol-
lowing cross-examination: "Q: Witness, is it true that on October 1, 1981, at ap-
proximately 5:00 p.m., you were arrested by an Officer Homes for allegedly stealing 
a Jensen car stereo model number 4477 from a 1970 Blue Volkswagon Beetle Mary-
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the prior bad act occurred, and then the witness denies the act under 
oath, they will be even more likely to distrust the witness's testimony 
concerning the case. In comparison, asking a highly detailed question for 
which no reasonable basis exists causes undue prejudice to the witness, 
and, as Cox indicated, is prohibited. 
In accordance with the rule forbidding use of extrinsic evidence for 
impeachment, the introduction of documents proving prior bad acts 
should be prohibited. One Maryland court has permitted the introduc-
tion of documents that formed the reasonable basis for the inquiry in 
order to contradict the witness's denial of the act.80 This practice is un-
acceptable under Cox, because the theory behind the rule requiring coun-
sel to accept the witness's answer is that unfair surprise is avoided 
because the witness does not have to produce rebuttal evidence.8! In or-
der to prevent unfair surprise, encourage judicial economy, and avoid 
confusion of the issues, the introduction of such documents should be 
forbidden. 
An inconsistency results from Cox's adoption of the majority rule 
that inquiry into prior bad acts for impeachment is permitted when the 
inquiry is probative of veracity, but prohibited when it involves mere ac-
cusations or charges of misconduct. A conflict arises between the two 
principles when the witness has been charged with, but not convicted of, 
some alleged misconduct, and the inquiry satisfies the Robinson two-
prong test. 82 When such an overlap of the rules occurs, inquiry concern-
ing the prior bad act should be permitted. Under the present Maryland 
rule, inquiry into charges or accusations of misconduct is forbidden be-
cause proof that the act was actually committed is lacking. Yet as long as 
the reasonable basis prong of the two-prong test is satisfied, the danger of 
lack of proof is eliminated. 
The Cox decision makes it clear that prior bad acts may be used to 
impeach a witness's credibility so long as the act is probative of veracity 
and is readily provable. Cox provides greater latitude to the cross-exam-
iner to inquire into prior misconduct, and sets forth adequate standards 
to determine when inquiry should be permitted.83 While the need to as-
land License E.C. from the parking lot at 800 Charles St. in Baltimore, Md.? A: 
No." In such a situation, the jury may tend to believe that the theft actually 
occurred. 
80. Mahan v. State, 172 Md. 373, 379, 191 A. 575, 578-79 (1937) (certified copy of 
license application admitted to show defendant lied on the application). But see 
supra text accompanying notes 24-25. 
81. Cox, 298 Md. at 199, 468 A.2d at 322. 
82. For example, the inquiry in Cox would be admissible under the two-prong test be-
cause there was a reasonable basis for asking the prosecutrix about bringing a false 
claim, and the act was probative of the prosecutrix's veracity. If, before the Cox 
case, the state had brought a perjury charge against the prosecutrix for lying under 
oath, and that charge was pending when Cox was tried, then the inquiry would 
apparently not be admissible because of the rule prohibiting inquiry into mere accu-
sations or charges of misconduct. 
83. One indication that Cox represents a significant change in Maryland law is that the 
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sess accurately a witness's credibility is great, that need must be weighed 
against the prejudice to the witness and confusion to the fact finder 
caused when specific acts are admitted to impeach. The problem of de-
termining whether certain specific acts are probative of truthtelling is re-
flected in the difficulty Maryland courts have encountered in determining 
which prior convictions are probative of veracity.84 Maryland's rule, 
which allows impeachment by prior convictions ranging from the vague 
"crimes of moral turpitude"85 to lesser crimes that go to truth telling, 86 is 
too ambiguous a standard to determine properly which prior convictions 
are admissible to assess a witness's credibility. In comparison, the two-
pronged test as to specific acts not resulting in conviction, as established 
in Cox and Robinson, provides Maryland courts with a much needed 
standard of strict scrutiny for determining what prior bad acts can be 
used to impeach. 
John Jude Hathway 
Maryland Judges' Benchbook, a quick reference for trial judges compiled prior to 
the Cox decision, stated: "[ c ]redibility of a witness may not be attacked or supported 
by evidence of specific instances of conduct of a witness . . . . Maryland has not 
followed those jurisdictions which permit a witness to be cross-examined as to spe-
cific conduct not reSUlting in criminal conviction." MARYLAND TRIAL JUDGES' 
BENCH BOOK, EV-18 (1977). 
84. See supra note 12. 
85. See Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 706-07, 436 A.2d 906, 909 (1981). 
86. Id. at 708, 436 A.2d at 910. 
